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Measuring Skill in the Mutual Fund Industry∗ 
Jonathan B. Berk Jules H. van Binsbergen 
Stanford University and NBER Stanford University and NBER 
February 2, 2013 
Abstract 
Using the dollar-value that a mutual fund adds as the measure of skill, we ﬁnd 
that the average mutual fund adds about $2 million per year and that this skill 
persists for as long as 10 years. We further document that investors recognize this 
skill and reward it by investing more capital with better funds. Better funds earn 
higher aggregate fees, and there is a strong positive correlation between current 
compensation and future performance. 
∗We could not have conducted this research without the help of the following research assistants to 
whom we are grateful: Ashraf El Gamal, Maxine Holland, Christine Kang, Fon Kulalert, Ian Linford, 
Binying Liu, Jin Ngai, Michael Nolop, William Vijverberg, and Christina Zhu. We thank George Chacko, 
Rick Green, Ralph Koijen, David Musto, Paul Pﬂeiderer, Anamaria Pieschacon, Robert Stambaugh 
and seminar participants at Robeco, Stockholm School of Economics, Stanford University, University of 
Chicago, University of Toronto, Vanderbilt, Wharton, the NBER summer institute, and the Stanford 
Berkeley joint seminar for helpful comments and suggestions. 
An important principle of economics is that agents earn economic rents if, and only
 
if, they have a skill in short supply. As central as this principle is to microeconomics, 
surprisingly little empirical work has addressed the question of whether or not talent 
is actually rewarded, or, perhaps more interestingly, whether people without talent can 
earn rents. One notable exception is the research on mutual fund managers. There, an 
extensive literature in ﬁnancial economics has focused on the question of whether stock 
picking or market timing talent exists. Interestingly, the literature has not been able to 
provide a deﬁnitive answer to this question. Considering that mutual fund managers are 
among the highest paid members of society, this lack of consensus is surprising because 
it leaves open the possibility that mutual fund managers earn economic rents without 
possessing a skill in short supply. 
Given the importance of the question, the objective of this paper is to re-examine 
whether or not mutual funds earn economic rents without possessing skill. We ﬁnd that 
the average mutual fund adds value by extracting about $2 million a year from ﬁnancial 
markets. More importantly, this value added is persistent. Funds that have added value in 
the past keep adding value in the future, for as long as 10 years. It is hard to reconcile our 
ﬁndings with anything other than the existence of money management skill. We ﬁnd that 
the distribution of managerial talent is consistent with the predictions of Lucas (1978): 
higher skilled managers manage larger funds and reap higher rewards. One of our most 
surprising results is that investors appear to be able to identify talent and compensate it: 
current compensation predicts future performance. 
Our methodology diﬀers from prior work in a number of important respects. First, 
our dataset includes all actively managed U.S. mutual funds, thereby greatly increasing 
the power of our tests. Prior work has used shorter time periods and focused atten­
tion exclusively on funds that only hold U.S. stocks. Second, in addition to evaluating 
managers using a risk model, we also evaluate managers by comparing their performance 
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to the investor’s alternative investment opportunity set — all available Vanguard index 
funds (including funds that hold non-U.S. stocks). Prior work that has benchmarked 
managers in this way, has not ensured that these alternative opportunities were tradable 
and marketed at the time. 
Finally, many prior studies have used the net alpha to investors, i.e., the average 
abnormal return net of fees and expenses, to assess whether or not managers have skill. 
However, as Berk and Green (2004) argue, if skill is in short supply, the net return 
is determined in equilibrium by competition between investors, and not by the skill of 
managers. One might hypothesize, based on this insight, that the gross alpha (the average 
abnormal return before fees) would be the correct measure of managerial skill. However, 
the gross alpha is a return measure, not a value measure. That is, a manager who adds 
a gross alpha of 1% on a $10 billion fund adds more value than a manager who adds a 
gross alpha of 10% on a $1 million fund. Thus, a better measure of skill is the expected 
value the fund adds, i.e., the product of the fund’s abnormal return (the return before 
fees minus the benchmark return) and assets under management (AUM). This measure 
consists of two parts: the amount of money the fund charges in fees (the percentage fee 
multiplied by AUM), plus the amount it takes from or gives to investors (the overall dollar 
under- or over-performance relative to the benchmark). The amount of money collected 
in fees by the fund can only come from one of two places — investors in the fund or 
ﬁnancial markets. By subtracting the amount of money taken from investors from the 
fees charged, we are left with the money extracted from ﬁnancial markets. That is, the 
value added of the fund. 
The strongest evidence we provide for the existence of investment skill is the pre­
dictability we document in value added. We ﬁnd that past value added can predict future 
value added as far out as 10 years, which is substantially longer than what the existing 
literature has found using alpha measures. To understand why our results diﬀer from the 
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existing literature, consider a concrete example. In his ﬁrst 5 years managing Fidelity’s 
Magellan fund, Peter Lynch had a 2% monthly gross alpha on average assets of about $40 
million. In his last 5 years, his gross alpha was 20 basis points (b.p.) per month on assets 
that ultimately grew to over $10 billion. Based on the lack of persistence in gross alpha, 
one could mistakenly conclude that most of Peter Lynch’s early performance was due to 
luck rather than skill. In fact, his value added went from less than $1 million/month to 
over $20 million/month, justifying his reputation as one of the most successful mutual 
fund managers of all time. 
The advantage of using our measure of value added is that it quantiﬁes the amount 
of money the fund extracts from ﬁnancial markets. What it does not measure is how 
the mutual fund company chooses to distribute this money. For example, some have 
argued that Peter Lynch’s success resulted from Fidelity’s superior marketing eﬀorts. 
Our measure provides no insight into what resources Fidelity brought to bear to maximize 
Magellan’s value added. It simply measures the end result. Of course, marketing eﬀorts 
alone are not suﬃcient to generate a positive value added. If Peter Lynch had had no 
skill, he would have extracted nothing from ﬁnancial markets and our value added measure 
would be zero. The costs of all other input factors, including marketing, would have been 
borne by investors. In fact, Fidelity’s marketing skills might very well have complemented 
Peter Lynch’s stock picking skills, and thus played a role in the twenty fold increase in 
Magellan’s value added. Consequently, our measure should be interpreted broadly as the 
resulting product of all the skills used to extract money from ﬁnancial markets. 
We benchmark managers against the investment opportunity set faced by a passive 
investor, in this case the net return of Vanguard’s index funds. Consequently, our measure 
of value added includes the value these funds provide in diversiﬁcation services. By 
benchmarking funds against the gross return of Vanguard’s index funds (that is, the 
return before the cost Vanguard charges for diversiﬁcation services) we can also measure 
3
 
value added without diversiﬁcation services. By undertaking this analysis, we ﬁnd that 
about half of the total value the mean fund adds is attributable to diversiﬁcation services 
and the other half to market timing and stock picking. 
The primary ob jective of this paper is to measure the value added of mutual funds. 
Our perspective is therefore diﬀerent from many papers in the mutual fund literature 
that are primarily concerned with the abnormal returns that investors earn in the fund. 
Nevertheless, we do provide new insight on that question as well. Once we evaluate 
managers against a tradable benchmark, we no longer ﬁnd evidence of underperformance. 
Over the time period in our sample, the equally weighted net alpha is 3 b.p. per month 
and the value weighted net alpha is -1 b.p. per month. Neither estimate is signiﬁcantly 
diﬀerent from zero. Notice that in equilibrium investors should be indiﬀerent between 
indexing their money or using an active manager. Therefore, when a benchmark that 
does not include transaction costs is used, we should expect to see a negative net alpha. 
This is what we ﬁnd when we use the Fama-French-Carhart portfolios as the alternative 
opportunity set. Of course, the lack of transaction costs in the benchmark should not 
aﬀect the relative performance of funds, and so, importantly, our persistence results do 
not depend on the benchmark or risk adjustment we use. Neither does our result that 
the average fund adds value. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we brieﬂy review 
the literature. In Section 2 we derive our measure of skill and in Section 3 we explain 
how we estimate it. We describe the data in Section 4. Section 5 demonstrates that skill 
exists. We then analyze how this skill is rewarded in Section 6. Section 7 investigates 
what portion of managerial skill is attributable to diversiﬁcation services rather than other 
sources, such as stock picking or market timing. Section 8 shows the importance of using 
the full sample of active funds rather than the subset most researchers have used in the 
past. Section 9 concludes the paper. 
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1 Background 
The idea that active mutual fund managers lack skill has its roots in the very early days of 
modern ﬁnancial economics (Jensen (1968)). Indeed, the original papers that introduced 
the Eﬃcient Market Hypothesis (Fama (1965, 1970)) cite the evidence that, as a group, 
investors in active mutual funds underperform the market, and, more importantly, mutual 
fund performance is unpredictable. Although an extensive review of this literature is 
beyond the scope of this paper, the conclusion of the literature is that, as investment 
vehicles, active funds underperform passive ones, and, on average, mutual fund returns 
before fees show no evidence of outperformance. This evidence is taken to imply that 
active managers do not have the skills required to beat the market, and so in Burton 
Malkiel’s words: the “study of mutual funds does not provide any reason to abandon a 
belief that securities markets are remarkably eﬃcient” (Malkiel, 1995, p. 571). 
In a recent paper on the subject, Fama and French (2010) re-examine the evidence 
and conclude that the average manager lacks skill. They do ﬁnd some evidence of talent 
in the upper tail of the distribution of managers. However, based on their estimate of skill 
(gross alpha), they conclude that this skill is economically small. In this paper, we argue 
that the economic magnitude of skill can only be assessed by measuring the total dollar 
value added not the abnormal return generated. As we will see, when the economic value 
added is calculated by multiplying the abnormal return by assets under management, a 
completely diﬀerent picture emerges: a top 10% manager is able to use her skill to add 
about $24 million a year, on average. 
Researchers have also studied persistence in mutual fund performance. Using the 
return the fund makes for its investors, a number of papers (see Gruber (1996), Carhart 
(1997), Zheng (1999) and Bollen and Busse (2001)) have documented that performance 
is largely unpredictable, leading researchers to conclude that outperformance is driven by 
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luck rather than talent.1 In contrast, we show that the value added of a fund is persistent. 
Despite the widespread belief that managers lack skill, there is in fact a literature in 
ﬁnancial economics that does ﬁnd evidence of skill. One of the earliest papers is Grinblatt 
and Titman (1989), which documents positive gross alphas for small funds and growth 
funds. In a follow-up paper (Grinblatt and Titman (1993)), these authors show that at 
least for a subset of mutual fund managers, stocks perform better when they are held by 
the managers than when they are not. Wermers (2000) ﬁnds that the stocks that mutual 
funds hold, outperform broad market indices, and Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers (2000) 
ﬁnd that the stocks that managers buy outperform the stocks that they sell. Kosowski, 
Timmermann, Wermers, and White (2006) use a bootstrap analysis and ﬁnd evidence, 
using gross and net alphas, that 10% of managers have skill. Kacperczyk, Sialm, and 
Zheng (2008) compare the actual performance of funds to the performance of the funds’ 
beginning of quarter holdings. They ﬁnd that, for the average fund, performance is 
indistinguishable, suggesting superior performance gross of fees, and thus implying that 
the average manager adds value during the quarter. Cremers and Peta jisto (2009) show 
that the amount a fund deviates from its benchmark is associated with better performance, 
and that this superior performance is persistent. Cohen, Polk, and Silli (2010) and Jiang, 
Verbeek, and Wang (2011) show that this performance results from overweighting stocks 
that subsequently outperform the stocks that are underweighted. Finally, Del Guercio 
and Reuter (2013) ﬁnd that directly sold funds, that is, funds not marketed by brokers, 
do not underperform index funds after fees, thus implying outperformance before fees. 
There is also evidence suggesting where this skill comes from. Coval and Moskowitz 
(2001) ﬁnd that geography is important; funds that invest a greater proportion of their 
assets locally do better. Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005) ﬁnd that funds that con­
1Some evidence of persistence does exist in low liquidity sectors or at shorter horizons, see, for example, 
Bollen and Busse (2005), Mamaysky, Spiegel, and Zhang (2008) or Berk and Tonks (2007). 
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centrate in industries do better than funds that do not. Baker, Litov, Wachter, and 
Wurgler (2010) show that, around earnings announcement dates, stocks that active man­
agers purchase outperform stocks that they sell. Shumway, Szeﬂer, and Yuan (2009) 
produce evidence that superior performance is associated with beliefs that more closely 
predict future performance. Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2007) ﬁnd that portfolio man­
agers place larger bets on ﬁrms they are connected to through their social network and 
perform signiﬁcantly better on these holdings relative to their non-connected holdings. 
Using holdings data, Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) ﬁnd some evidence 
of stock selection (particularly amongst aggressive growth funds) but fail to ﬁnd evidence 
of market timing. Kacperczyk, Nieuwerburgh, and Veldkamp (2011) provide evidence 
that managers successfully market time in bad times and select stocks in good times. 
These studies suggest that the superior performance documented in other studies in this 
literature is likely due to specialized knowledge and information. 
Despite evidence to the contrary, many researchers in ﬁnancial economics remain un­
convinced that mutual fund managers have skill. This reticence is at least partly at­
tributable to the lack of any convincing evidence of the value added that results from this 
talent. Our objective is to provide this evidence. 
2 Theory and Deﬁnitions 
Let Rn denote the excess return (that is, the net-return in excess of the risk free rate) it 
earned by investors in the i’th fund at time t. This return can be split up into the return 
of the investor’s next best alternative investment opportunity RB it , which we will call the 
manager’s benchmark, and a deviation from the benchmark εit: 
Rn it = R
B (1)it + εit. 
7
 
� � 
The most commonly used measure of skill in the literature is the mean of εit, or the net 
alpha, denoted by αn i . Assuming that the benchmark return is observed (we relax this 
assumption later), the net alpha can be consistently estimated by: 
1 
Ti   1 Ti
αn Rn − RBˆi = it it = εit. (2)Ti Ti t=1 t=1 
where Ti is the number of periods that fund i appears in the database. 
As we pointed out in the introduction, the net alpha is a measure of the abnormal 
return earned by investors, not the skill of the manager. To understand why, recall the 
intuition that Eugene Fama used to motivate the Eﬃcient Market Hypothesis: just as 
the expected return of a ﬁrm does not reﬂect the quality of its management, neither 
does the expected return of a mutual fund. Instead, what the net alpha measures is 
the rationality and competitiveness of capital markets. If markets are competitive and 
investors rational, the net alpha will be zero. A positive net alpha implies that capital 
markets are not competitive and that the supply of capital is insuﬃcient to compete away 
the abnormal return. A negative net alpha implies that investors are committing too 
much capital to active management. It is evidence of sub-optimality on the part of at 
least some investors.2 
Some have argued that the gross alpha, αg i , the abnormal return earned by fund i 
before management expenses are deducted, should be used to measure managerial skill. 
Let Rg denote the gross excess return, or the excess return the fund makes before it takes it 
out the fee fit: 
Rg ≡ Rn = RB (3)i,t it + fit it + εit + fit. 
2For a formal model that relates this underperformance to decreasing returns to scale at the industry 
level, see Pastor and Stambaugh (2010). 
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The gross alpha can then be consistently estimated as:
 
Ti Ti1 1 
αg Rg − RBˆi = it it = (fit + εit) . (4)Ti Ti t=1 t=1 
Unfortunately, just as the internal rate of return cannot be used to measure the value of 
an investment opportunity (it is the net present value that does), the gross alpha cannot 
be used to measure the value of a fund. It measures the return the fund earns, not the 
value it adds. 
To correctly measure the skills that are brought to bear to extract money from markets, 
one has to measure the dollar value of what the fund adds over the benchmark. To 
compute this measure, we multiply the benchmark adjusted realized gross return, Rg −RB it it , 
by the real size of the fund (assets under management adjusted by inﬂation) at the end 
of the previous period, qi,t−1, to obtain the realized value added between times t − 1 and 
t: 
Rg − RBVit ≡ qi,t−1 it it = qi,t−1fit + qi,t−1εit, (5) 
where the second equality follows from (3). This estimate of value added consists of two 
parts — the part the fund takes as compensation (the dollar value of all fees charged), 
which is necessarily positive, plus any value the fund provides (or extracts from) investors, 
which can be either positive or negative. Our measure of skill is the (time series) expec­
tation of (5): 
Si ≡ E[Vit]. (6) 
For a fund that exists for Ti periods, this estimated value added is given by: 
Ti
 Vit

Sˆi = . (7)
Tit=1 
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�The average value added can be estimated in one of two ways. If we are interested in 
the mean of the distribution from which value added is drawn, what we term the ex-ante 
distribution, then a consistent estimate of its mean is given by: 
N
1¯ ˆS = Si, (8)
N 
i=1 
where N is the number of mutual funds in our database. Alternatively, we might be 
interested in the mean of surviving funds, what we term the ex-post distribution. In 
this case, the average value added is estimated by weighting each fund by the number of 
periods that it appears in the database: 
 N ˆTiSi
S¯W =
i=1 . (9) N 
i=1 Ti 
Before we turn to how we actually compute Vit and therefore Si, it is worth ﬁrst considering 
what the main hypotheses in the literature imply about this measure of skill. 
Unskilled managers, irrational investors 
A widely accepted hypothesis, and the one considered in Fama and French (2010), is that 
no manager has skill. We call this the strong form no-skill hypothesis, originally put 
forward in Fama (1965, 1970). Because managers are unskilled and yet charge fees, these 
fees can only come out of irrational investors’ pockets. These managers can either invest 
in the index, in which case they do not destroy value, or worse than that, they can follow 
the classic example of “monkey investing” by throwing darts and incurring unnecessary 
transaction costs. So under this hypothesis: 
Si ≤ 0, for every i, (10) 
αn i ≤ −E (fit) , for every i. (11) 
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�Because no individual manager has skill, the average manager does not have skill either.
 
Thus, this hypothesis also implies that we should expect to ﬁnd 
N 
S¯ = 
1 
N 
Sˆi ≤ 0. (12) 
i=1 
The latter equation can also be tested in isolation. We term this the weak form no-skill 
hypothesis. This weak-form hypothesis states that even though some individual managers 
may have skill, the average manager does not, implying that at least as much value is 
destroyed by active mutual fund managers as is created. We will take this two part 
hypothesis as the Null Hypothesis in this paper. 
If managers are unskilled, then by deﬁnition, skill must be unpredictable. That is, 
under the strong form of the Null Hypothesis, positive past value added cannot predict 
future value added. Therefore, persistence of positive value added in the data implies a 
rejection of this Null Hypothesis. It may be tempting to conclude that because AUM is 
persistent, it is possible to observe persistence in value added, even if return outperfor­
mance relative to the benchmark is not persistent. However, if past outperformance was 
due to luck and therefore does not persist into the future, then Et[R
g − RB = 0i,t+1 i,t+1] 
implying that Et[qit(R
g − RB i,t+1)] = 0. That is, value added is not persistent. i,t+1 
Skilled managers, rational investors 
The second hypothesis we consider is motivated by Berk and Green (2004) and states that 
managers have skill that is in short supply. Because of competition in capital markets, 
investors do not beneﬁt from this skill. Instead, managers derive the full beneﬁt of the 
economic rents they generate from their skill. If investors are fully rational, then these 
assumptions imply that the net return that investors expect to make is equal to the 
benchmark return. That is: 
αn i = 0, for every i. (13) 
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Because fees are positive, the expected value added is positive for every manager:
 
Si > 0, for every i. (14) 
When investors cannot observe skill perfectly, the extent to which an individual manager 
actually adds value depends on the ability of investors to diﬀerentiate talented managers 
from charlatans. If we recognize that managerial skill is diﬃcult to measure, then one 
would expect unskilled managers to take advantage of this uncertainty. We would then 
expect to observe the presence of charlatans, i.e., managers who charge a fee but have no 
skill. Thus when skill cannot be perfectly observed, it is possible that for some managers 
Si ≤ 0. However, even when skill is not perfectly observable, because investors are 
rational, every manager must still add value in expectation. Under this hypothesis, the 
average manager must generate value, and hence we would expect to ﬁnd: 
S¯ > 0. (15) 
We will take this hypothesis as the Alternative Hypothesis. 
Some have claimed, based on Sharpe (1991), that in a general equilibrium it is im­
possible for the average manager to add value. In fact, this argument has two ﬂaws. To 
understand the ﬂaws, it is worth quickly reviewing Sharpe’s original argument. Sharpe 
divided all investors into two sets: people who hold the market portfolio, whom he called 
“passive” investors, and the rest, whom he called “active” investors. Because market 
clearing requires that the sum of active and passive investors’ portfolios is the market 
portfolio, the sum of just active investors’ portfolios must also be the market portfolio. 
This observation immediately implies that the abnormal return of the average active in­
vestor must be zero. As convincing as the argument appears to be, it cannot be used to 
conclude that the average active mutual fund manager cannot add value. In his deﬁnition 
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of “active” investors, Sharpe includes any investor not holding the market, not just active 
mutual fund managers. If active individual investors exist, then as a group active mutual 
fund managers could provide a positive abnormal return by making trading proﬁts from 
individual investors who make a negative abnormal return. Of course, as a group individ­
ual active investors are better oﬀ investing in the market, which leaves open the question 
of why these individuals are actively trading. 
Perhaps more surprisingly to some, Sharpe’s argument does not rule out the possibility 
that the average active manager can earn a higher return than the market return even 
if all investors, including individual investors, are assumed to be fully rational. What 
Sharpe’s argument ignores is that even a passive investor must trade at least twice, once 
to get into the passive position and once to get out of the position. If we assume that 
active investors are better informed than passive, then whenever these liquidity trades 
are made with an active investor, in expectation, the passive investor must lose and the 
active must gain. Hence, the expected return to active investors must exceed the return 
to passive investors, that is, active investors earn a liquidity premium. 
3 Choice of Benchmarks and Estimation 
To measure the value that the fund either gives to or takes from investors, performance 
must be compared to the performance of the next best investment opportunity available 
to investors at the time, which we have termed the benchmark. Thus far, we have assumed 
that this benchmark return is known. In reality it is not known, so in this section we 
describe two methods we use to identify the benchmark. 
The standard practice in ﬁnancial economics is not to actually construct the alternative 
investment opportunity itself, but rather to simply adjust for risk using a factor model. 
In recent years, the extent to which factor models accurately correct for risk has been 
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subject to extensive debate. In response to this, mutual fund researchers have opted to 
construct the alternative investment opportunity directly instead of using factor models 
to adjust for risk. That is, they have interpreted the factors in the factor models as 
investment opportunities available to investors, rather than risk factors.3 The problem 
with this interpretation is that these factor portfolios were (and in some cases are) not 
actually available to investors. 
There are two reasons investors cannot invest in the factor portfolios. The ﬁrst is 
straightforward: these portfolios do not take transaction costs into account. For example, 
the momentum strategy requires high turnover, which not only incurs high transaction 
costs, but also requires time and eﬀort to implement. Consequently, momentum index 
funds do not exist.4 The second reason is more subtle. Many of these factor portfolios were 
discovered well after the typical starting date of mutual fund databases. For example, 
when the ﬁrst active mutual funds started oﬀering size and value-based strategies, the 
alternative investment opportunity set was limited to investments in individual stocks 
and well-diversiﬁed index funds. That is, these active managers were being rewarded for 
the skill of ﬁnding a high return strategy that was not widely known. It has taken a 
considerable amount of time for most investors to discover these strategies, and so using 
portfolios that can only be constructed with the beneﬁt of hindsight ignores the skill 
required to uncover these strategies in real time. 
For these reasons we take two approaches to measuring skill in this paper. First, we 
follow the recent literature by adopting a benchmark approach and taking a stand on the 
alternative investment opportunity set. Where we depart from the literature, however, is 
that we ensure that this alternative investment opportunity was marketed and tradable 
3See, for example, Fama and French (2010). Note that interpreting the benchmarks as alternative 
investment opportunities is not the same argument as the one made by Pastor and Stambaugh (2002) 
for using benchmarks. 
4AQR introduced a momentum “index” fund in 2009 but the fund charges 75 b.p. which is close to 
the mean fee in our sample of active funds. It also requires a $1 million minimum investment. 
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�at the time. Because Vanguard mutual funds are widely regarded as the least costly 
method to hold a well-diversiﬁed portfolio, we take the set of passively managed index 
funds oﬀered by Vanguard as the alternative investment opportunity set.5 We then deﬁne 
the benchmark as the closest portfolio in that set to the mutual fund. If Rt 
j is the excess 
return earned by investors in the j’th Vanguard index fund at time t, then the benchmark 
return for fund i is given by: 
n(t) 
RB βj Rj it = i t , (16) 
j=1 
where n(t) is the total number of index funds oﬀered by Vanguard at time t and βj i is 
obtained from the appropriate linear projection of the i’th active mutual fund onto the 
set of Vanguard index funds. By using Vanguard index funds as benchmarks, we can be 
certain that investors had the opportunity to invest in the funds at the time and that 
the returns of these funds necessarily include transaction costs and reﬂect the dynamic 
evolution of active strategies. Notice, also, that if we use this benchmark to evaluate 
a Vanguard index fund itself, we would conclude that that fund adds value equal to 
the dollar value of the fees it charges. Vanguard funds add value because they provide 
investors with the lowest cost means to diversiﬁcation. When we use net returns on 
Vanguard index funds as the benchmark, we are explicitly accounting for the value added 
of diversiﬁcation services. Because active funds also provide diversiﬁcation services, our 
measure credits them with this value added. 
Of course, one might also be interested in whether active funds add value over and 
above the diversiﬁcation services they provide. In Section 7, we investigate this question by 
using the gross returns on the Vanguard index funds as the benchmark thereby separating 
diversiﬁcation services from stock picking and market timing. As we will see, even without 
5The ownership structure of Vanguard — it is owned by the investors in its funds — also makes it 
attractive as a benchmark because there is no conﬂict of interest between the investors in the fund and 
the fund owners. Bogle (1997) provides a brief history of Vanguard’s index fund business. 
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including diversiﬁcation services, value added is highly persistent and positive.
 
Second, we use the traditional risk-based approach. The standard in the literature 
implicitly assumes the riskiness of the manager’s portfolio can be measured using the 
factors identiﬁed by Fama and French (1995) and Carhart (1997), hereafter, the Fama­
French-Carhart (FFC) factor speciﬁcation. In this case the benchmark return is the return 
of a portfolio of equivalent riskiness constructed from the FFC factor portfolios: 
= βmkt RB MKTt + β
smlSMLt + β
hmlHMLt + β
umdUMDt,it i i i i 
where MKTt, SMLt, HMLt and UMDt are the realizations of the four factor portfolios and 
βi 
· are risk exposures of the i’th mutual fund, which can be estimated by regressing the 
fund’s return onto the factors. Although standard practice, this approach has the draw­
back that no theoretical argument exists justifying why these factors measure systematic 
risk in the economy. Fama and French (2010) recognize this limitation but argue that 
one can interpret the factors as simply alternative (passive) investment opportunities. As 
we point out above, such an interpretation is only valid when the factors are tradable 
portfolios. 
We picked eleven Vanguard index funds to use as benchmark funds (see Table 1). We 
arrived at this set by excluding all bond or real estate index funds and any fund that was 
already spanned by existing funds.6 Because the eleven funds do not exist throughout 
our sample period, we ﬁrst arrange the funds in order of how long they have been in 
existence. We then construct an orthogonal basis set out of these funds by projecting 
the nth fund onto the orthogonal basis produced by the ﬁrst n − 1 funds over the time 
period when the nth fund exists. The mean plus residual of this projection is the nth fund 
in the orthogonal basis. In the time periods in which the nth basis fund does not exist, 
6The complete list of all Vanguard’s Index funds can be found here: 
https://personal.vanguard.com/us/funds/vanguard/all?reset=true&mgmt=i. 
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Fund Name Ticker Asset Class Inception Date 
S&P 500 Index VFINX Large-Cap Blend 08/31/1976 
Extended Market Index VEXMX Mid-Cap Blend 12/21/1987 
Small-Cap Index NAESX Small-Cap Blend 01/01/1990* 
European Stock Index VEURX International 06/18/1990 
Paciﬁc Stock Index VPACX International 06/18/1990 
Value Index VVIAX Large-Cap Value 11/02/1992 
Balanced Index VBINX Balanced 11/02/1992 
Emerging Markets Stock Index VEIEX International 05/04/1994 
Mid-Cap Index VIMSX Mid-Cap Blend 05/21/1998 
Small-Cap Growth Index VISGX Small-Cap Growth 05/21/1998 
Small-Cap Value Index VISVX Small-Cap Value 05/21/1998 
Table 1: Benchmark Vanguard Index Funds: This table lists the set of Vanguard Index Funds 
used to calculate the Vanguard benchmark. The listed ticker is for the Investor class shares which we 
use until Vanguard introduced an Admiral class for the fund, and thereafter we use the return on the 
Admiral class shares (Admiral class shares have lower fees but require a higher minimum investment.) 
*NAESX was introduced earlier but was originally not an index fund. It was converted to an index fund 
in late 1989, so the date in the table reﬂects the ﬁrst date we included the fund in the benchmark set. 
we insert zero. We then construct an augmented basis by replacing the zero in the time 
periods when the basis fund does not exist with the mean return of the basis fund when 
it does exist. We show in the appendix that value added can be consistently estimated 
jby ﬁrst computing the projection coeﬃcients (βi in (16)) using the augmented basis and 
then calculating the benchmark return using (16) and the basis where missing returns are 
replaced with zeros. 
To quantify the advantages of using Vanguard funds rather than the FFC factor mim­
icking portfolios as benchmark funds, Table 2 shows the results of regressing each FFC 
factor mimicking portfolio on the basis set of passively managed index funds oﬀered by 
Vanguard. Only the market portfolio does not have a statistically signiﬁcant positive 
alpha. Clearly, the FFC factor mimicking portfolios were better investment opportuni­
ties than what was actually available to investors at the time. In addition, the R2 of 
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the regressions are informative. The value/growth strategy became available as an index 
fund after size, so it is not surprising that the R2 of the SMB portfolio is higher than the 
HML portfolio. Furthermore, the momentum strategy involves a large amount of active 
trading, so it is unlikely to be fully captured by passive portfolios, which accounts for the 
fact that the UMD portfolio has the lowest R2 and the highest alpha. 
MKT SMB HML UMD 
Alpha (b.p./month) 2 22 35 70 
t-Statistic 0.83 2.80 3.37 3.38 
Adjusted R2 99% 74% 52% 15% 
Table 2: Net Alpha of FFC Portfolios: We regress each FFC factor portfolio on the Vanguard 
Benchmark portfolios. The table lists the estimate (in b.p./month) and t-statistic of the constant term 
(Alpha) of each regression, as well as the R2 of each regression. 
Given that the alpha of the FFC factor mimicking portfolios are positive, and that 
they do not represent actual investable alternatives, they cannot be interpreted as bench­
mark portfolios. Of course, the FFC factor speciﬁcation might still be a valid risk model 
for a U.S. investor implying that it will correctly price all traded assets in the U.S., in­
cluding U.S. mutual funds investing in international stocks. For completeness, we will 
report our results using both methods to calculate the fund’s alpha, but we will always 
interpret the Vanguard funds as benchmark portfolios and the FFC factor speciﬁcation 
as an adjustment for risk. 
4 Data 
Our main source of data is the CRSP survivorship bias free database of mutual fund data 
ﬁrst compiled in Carhart (1997). The data set spans the period from January 1962 to 
March 2011. Although this data set has been used extensively, it still has a number of 
important shortcomings that we needed to address in order to complete our study. We 
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undertook an extensive data pro ject to address these shortcomings, the details of which 
are described in a 35-page online appendix to this paper. The main outcome of this 
project is reported below. 
Even a casual perusal of the returns on CRSP is enough to reveal that some of the 
reported returns are suspect. Because part of our ob jective is to identify highly skilled 
managers, misreported returns, even if random, are of concern. Hence, we procured ad­
ditional data from Morningstar. Each month, Morningstar sends a complete updated 
database to its clients. The monthly update is intended to completely replace the pre­
vious update. We purchased every update from January 1995 through March 2011 and 
constructed a single database by combining all the updates. One ma jor advantage of this 
database is that it is guaranteed to be free of survivorship bias. Morningstar adds a new 
fund or removes an old fund in each new monthly update. By deﬁnition, it cannot change 
an old update because its clients already have that data. So, we are guaranteed that in 
each month whatever data we have was the actual data available to Morningstar’s clients 
at that time. 
We then compared the returns reported on CRSP to what was reported on Morn­
ingstar. Somewhat surprisingly, 3.3% of return observations diﬀered. Even if we restrict 
attention to returns that diﬀer by more than 10 b.p., 1.3% of the data is inconsistent. An 
example of this is when a 10% return is mistakenly reported as “10.0” instead of “0.10”. 
To determine which database is correct we used dividend and net asset value (NAV) in­
formation reported on the two databases to compute the return. In cases in which in one 
database the reported return is inconsistent with the computed return, but in which the 
other database was consistent, we used the consistent database return. If both databases 
were internally consistent, but diﬀered from each other, but within 6 months one database 
was internally inconsistent, we used the database that was internally consistent through­
out. Finally, we manually checked all remaining unresolved discrepancies that diﬀered by 
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more than 20 b.p. by comparing the return to that reported on Bloomberg. All told, we 
were able to correct about two thirds of the inconsistent returns. In all remaining cases, 
we used the return reported on CRSP. 
Unfortunately, there are even more discrepancies between what Morningstar and 
CRSP report for total assets under management (AUM). Even allowing for rounding 
errors, fully 16% of the data diﬀers across the two databases. Casual observation reveals 
that much of this discrepancy appears to derive from Morningstar often lagging CRSP 
in updating AUM. Consequently, when both databases report numbers, we use the num­
bers reported on CRSP with one important exception. If the number reported on CRSP 
changed by more than 8× (we observed a number of cases where the CRSP number is 
oﬀ by a ﬁxed number of decimal places) and within a few months the change was re­
versed by the same order of magnitude, and, in addition, this change was not observed on 
Morningstar, we used the value reported on Morningstar. Unfortunately, both databases 
contained signiﬁcant numbers of missing AUM observations. Even after we used both 
databases as a source of information, 17.2% of the data was missing. In these cases, we 
ﬁlled in any missing observations by using the most recent observation in the past. Fi­
nally, we adjusted all AUM numbers by inﬂation by expressing all numbers in January 1, 
2000 dollars. 
The amount of missing expense ratio data posed a ma jor problem.7 To compute the 
gross return, expense ratios are needed and over 40% of expense ratios are missing on the 
CRSP database. Because expense ratios are actually reported annually by funds, we were 
able to ﬁll in about 70% of these missing values by extending any reported observation 
during a year to the entire ﬁscal year of the fund and combining the information reported 
on Morningstar and CRSP. We then went to the SEC website and manually looked up 
the remaining missing values on EDGAR. At the end of this process, we were missing 
7Because fees are an important part of our skill measure, we chose not to follow Fama and French 
(2010) by ﬁlling in the missing expense ratios with the average expense ratios of funds with similar AUM. 
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only 1.6% of the observations, which we elected to drop. 
Both databases report data for active and passively managed funds. CRSP does 
not provide any way to discriminate between the funds. Morningstar provides this in­
formation, but their classiﬁcation does not seem very accurate, and we only have this 
information after 1995. We therefore augmented the Morningstar classiﬁcation by using 
the following algorithm to identify passively managed funds. We ﬁrst generated a list of 
common phrases that appear in fund names identiﬁed by Morningstar as index funds. We 
then compiled a list of funds with these common phrases that were not labeled as index 
funds by Morningstar and compiled a second list of common phrases from these funds’ 
names. We then manually checked the original prospectuses of any fund that contained a 
word from the ﬁrst list but was not identiﬁed as an index fund at any point in its life by 
Morningstar or was identiﬁed as an index fund at some point in its life by Morningstar 
but nevertheless contained a phrase in the second list. Funds that were not tracked by 
Morningstar (e.g., only existed prior to 1995) that contained a word from the ﬁrst list 
were also manually checked. Finally, we also manually checked cases in which fund names 
satisﬁed any of these criteria in some periods but not in others even when the Morningstar 
classiﬁcation was consistent with our name classiﬁcation to verify that indeed the fund 
had switched from active to passive or vice versa. We reclassiﬁed 14 funds using this 
algorithm. 
It is important to identify subclasses of mutual funds because both databases report 
subclasses as separate funds. In most cases, the only diﬀerence among subclasses is the 
amount of expenses charged to investors, so simply including them as separate funds 
would artiﬁcially increase the statistical signiﬁcance of any identiﬁed eﬀect. For funds 
that appear in the CRSP database, identifying subclasses is a relatively easy process 
— CRSP provides a separator in the fund name (either a “:” or a “/”). Information 
after the separator denotes a subclass. Unfortunately, Morningstar does not provide this 
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information, so for mutual funds that only appear on the Morningstar database, we used 
the last word in the fund name to identify the subclass (the details of how we did this are 
in the online appendix). Once identiﬁed we aggregated all subclasses into a single fund. 
We dropped all index funds, bond funds and money market funds8 and any fund 
observations before the fund’s (inﬂation adjusted) AUM reached $5 million. We also 
dropped funds with less than two years of data. In the end, we were left with 6054 
equity funds. This sample is considerably larger than comparable samples used by other 
researchers. There are a number of reasons for this. Firstly, we do not restrict attention to 
funds that hold only U.S. equity. Clearly, managerial skill, if it exists, could potentially 
be used to pick non-U.S. stocks. More importantly, by eliminating any fund that at 
any point holds a single non-U.S. stock, researchers have been eliminating managers who 
might have had the skill to opportunistically move capital to and from the U.S.9 Second, 
the Morningstar database contains funds not reported on CRSP. Third, we use the longest 
possible sample length available. 
When we use the Vanguard benchmark to compute abnormal returns we chose to 
begin the sample in the period just after Vanguard introduced its S&P 500 index fund, 
that is January 1977. Because few funds dropped out of the database prior to that date, 
the loss in data is minimal, and we are still left with 5974 funds. 
5 Results 
We begin by measuring managerial skill and then show that the skill we measure is 
persistent. As is common in the mutual fund literature, our unit of observation is the 
8We classiﬁed a fund as a bond fund if it held, on average, less than 50% of assets in stocks and 
identiﬁed a money market fund as a fund that on average held more than 20% of assets in cash. 
9It is important to appreciate that most of the additional funds still hold mainly U.S. stocks, it is just 
that they also hold some non-U.S. stocks. As we will discuss in Section 7 expanding the sample to all 
equity funds is not innocuous; not only is the statistical power of our tests greatly increased but, more 
importantly, we will show that managerial skill is correlated to the fraction of capital in non-U.S. stocks. 
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Figure 1: Fund Size Distribution 
The graph displays the evolution of the distribution of the logarithm of real assets under management in 
$ millions (base year is 2000) by plotting the 1st, 25th, 50th, 75th and 99th percentiles of the distribution 
at each point in time. The smooth black line is the logarithm of the total number of funds. 
fund not the individual manager. That is, we observe the dollar value the fund extracts 
from markets, or put another way, the fund’s monopoly proﬁts. We refer to these proﬁts as 
“managerial skill” for expositional ease. Given that this industry is highly labor intensive, 
it is hard to conceive of other sources of these proﬁts. However, it is important to keep 
in mind that this paper provides no direct evidence that these proﬁts result from human 
capital alone. 
5.1 Measuring Skill 
We begin by ﬁrst estimating Si for every fund in our sample. Because Si is the mean of 
the product of the abnormal return and fund size, one may have concerns about whether 
the product is stationary. Figure 1 allays such concerns because median inﬂation-adjusted 
fund size has remained roughly the same over our sample period. As the smooth solid 
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line in the ﬁgure makes clear, growth in the industry’s assets under management is driven
 
by increases in the number of funds rather than increases in fund size. 
Table 3 provides the cross-sectional distribution of Si in our sample. The average fund 
adds an economically signiﬁcant $140,000 per month (in Y2000 dollars). The standard 
error of this average is just $30,000, implying a t-statistic of 4.57. There is also large 
variation across funds. The fund at the 99th percentile cutoﬀ generated $7.82 million 
per month. Even the fund at the 90th percentile cutoﬀ generated $750,000 a month on 
average. The median fund lost an average of $20,000/month, and only 43% of funds had 
positive estimated value added. In summary, most funds destroyed value but because 
most of the capital is controlled by skilled managers, as a group, active mutual funds 
added value.10 
Thus far, we have ignored the fact that successful funds are more likely to survive 
than unsuccessful funds. Equivalently, one can think of the above statistics as estimates 
of the ex-ante distribution of talent. We can instead compute the time-weighted mean 
given by (9). In this case, we obtain an estimate of the ex-post distribution of talent, 
that is, the average skill of the set of funds actually managing money. Not surprisingly 
this estimate is higher. The average fund added $270,000/month. When we use the FFC 
factor speciﬁcation to correct for risk, we obtain very similar results. 
It is tempting, based on the magnitude of our t-statistics to conclude that the Null 
Hypothesis (in both weak and strong form) can be rejected. However, caution is in order. 
There are two reasons to believe that our t-statistics are overstated. First, there is likely to 
be correlation in value added across funds. Second, the value added distribution features 
excess kurtosis. Even though our panel includes 6000 funds and 411 months, the sample 
might not be large enough to ensure that the t-statistic is t-distributed. However, under 
10For the reasons pointed out in Linnainmaa (2012), our measures of value added underestimates the 
true skill of managers. 
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 Vanguard Benchmark FFC Risk Measure 
Cross-Sectional Mean 
Standard Error of the Mean 
t-Statistic 
0.14 
0.03 
4.57 
0.10 
0.03 
3.43 
1st Percentile 
5th Percentile 
10th Percentile 
50th Percentile 
90th Percentile 
95th Percentile 
99th Percentile 
-3.60 
-1.15 
-0.59 
-0.02 
0.75 
1.80 
7.82 
-3.93 
-1.43 
-0.77 
-0.03 
0.70 
1.98 
6.76 
Percent with less than zero 57.01% 59.70% 
Cross-Sectional Weighted Mean 
Standard Error of the Weighted Mean 
t-Statistic 
0.27 
0.05 
5.74 
0.25 
0.06 
3.94 
No. of Funds 5974 6054 
Table 3: Value Added ( Sˆi): For every fund in our database, we estimate the monthly value added, 
Sˆi. The Cross-Sectional mean, standard error, t-statistic and percentiles are the statistical properties 
of this distribution. Percent with less than zero is the fraction of the distribution that has value added 
estimates less than zero. The Cross-Sectional Weighted mean, standard error and t-statistic are computed 
¯by weighting by the number of periods the fund exists, that is, they are the statistical properties of SW 
deﬁned by (9). The numbers are reported in Y2000 $ millions per month. 
the strong form of the Null Hypothesis, value added cannot be persistent. Consequently, 
if the value added identiﬁed in Table 3 results from managerial skill rather than just luck, 
we must also see evidence of persistence — managers that added value in the past should 
continue to add value in the future. 
To test for persistence, we follow the existing literature and sort funds into deciles 
based on our inference of managerial skill. To infer skill at time τ , we construct what we 
term the Skill Ratio deﬁned as: 
S K R
τ i ≡
 , (17)
τ 
i
τ 
i Sˆ
σ(Sˆ )
 
√_τ Sτ )2 t=1(Vit− ˆ i 
τ
τwhere Si ˆ =
 
τ Vit τ 
iand σ(Sˆ )
 =
 .
 The skill ratio at any point in time
 t=1 τ
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is essentially the t-static of the value added estimate measured over the entire history of 
the fund until that time.11 We term the time period from the beginning of the fund to 
τ the sorting period. That is, the funds in the 10th (top) decile are the funds where we 
have the most conﬁdence that the actual value added over the sorting period is positive. 
Similarly, funds in the 1st (bottom) decile are funds where we have the most conﬁdence 
that the actual value added in the sorting period is negative. We then measure the 
average value added of funds in each decile over a speciﬁed future time horizon, hereafter 
12the measurement horizon. 
The main diﬃculty with implementing this strategy is uncertainty in the estimate of 
the fund’s betas. When estimation error in the sorting period is positively correlated to 
the error in the measurement horizon, a researcher could falsely conclude that evidence 
of persistence exists when there is no persistence. To avoid this bias we do not use 
information from the sorting period to estimate the betas in the measurement horizon. 
This means that we require a measurement horizon of suﬃcient length to produce reliable 
beta estimates, so the shortest measurement horizon we consider is three years. 
At each time τ , we use all the information until that point in time to sort ﬁrms into 10 
deciles based on the skill ratio. We require a fund to have at least three years of historical 
data to be included in the sort. For each fund in each decile, we then calculate the 
value added, {Vi,τ , . . . , Vi,τ+h}, over diﬀerent measurement horizons, h, varying between 
36 to 120 months using only the information in the measurement horizon. Because we 
need a minimum number of months, m, to estimate the fund’s betas in the measurement 
horizon, we drop all funds with less than m observations in the measurement horizon. 
To remove the obvious selection bias, for the remaining funds we drop the ﬁrst m value 
added observations as well, leaving the remaining observations exclusively in the horizon 
11For ease of exposition, we have assumed that the fund starts at time 1. For a fund that starts later, 
the start date in the skill ratio is adjusted to reﬂect this. 
12Similar results are obtained if we use the value added estimate itself to sort funds. 
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Panel A: Vanguard Benchmark
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Figure 2: Out-of-Sample Value Added 
Each graph displays average out-of-sample value added, Sˆi (in Y2000 $ million/month), of funds sorted 
into deciles on the Skill Ratio, over the future horizon indicated. The solid line indicates the performance 
of each decile and the dashed lines indicated the two standard error bounds. Panel A shows the results 
when value added is computed using Vanguard index funds as benchmark portfolios and Panel B shows 
the results using the FFC risk adjustment. 
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Horizon Value Added Top Outperforms Top in Fraction 
Bottom Top Half of Total 
Years $ Mil p-value (%) Freq. (%) p-value (%) Freq. (%) p-value (%) AUM (%) 
Panel A: Vanguard Benchmark 
3 1.19 2.51 56.32 4.75 56.32 4.75 24.82 
4 1.10 2.49 57.14 2.07 59.45 0.32 25.56 
5 2.32 0.11 55.81 3.54 56.98 1.46 24.34 
6 1.72 0.95 57.09 1.09 57.46 0.79 25.30 
7 2.47 0.00 61.57 0.01 64.55 0.00 22.57 
8 3.44 0.01 58.23 0.67 58.65 0.46 25.65 
9 2.42 1.00 54.21 9.15 55.31 4.50 24.94 
10 2.38 0.52 54.69 5.55 57.93 0.31 24.95 
Panel B: FCC Risk Adjustment 
3 1.30 1.33 56.13 0.47 57.63 0.06 17.93 
4 1.13 3.01 58.14 0.02 57.72 0.05 19.50 
5 1.03 2.68 59.60 0.00 58.79 0.01 17.88 
6 1.27 2.22 58.85 0.01 56.50 0.28 19.38 
7 0.98 3.37 59.71 0.00 56.12 0.44 17.91 
8 2.13 0.42 59.12 0.01 57.14 0.13 19.01 
9 1.35 1.12 56.51 0.18 55.15 1.09 16.10 
10 1.62 4.67 58.91 0.01 56.74 0.22 21.83 
Table 4: Out-of-sample Performance of the Top Decile: The two columns labeled “Value Added” 
report the average value added of the top decile at each horizon and the associated p-value. The next 
two columns report the fraction of the time and associate p-value the top decile has a higher value added 
realization than the bottom decile. The columns labeled “Top in Top Half” report the fraction of time 
the realized value added of the top decile is in the top half, and the ﬁnal column reports the average 
fraction of total AUM in the top decile. All p-values are one tailed, that is, they represent the probability, 
under the Null Hypothesis, of the observed test-statistic value or greater. 
{Vi,τ+m, . . . , Vi,τ +h}. Because the Vanguard benchmark has at most 11 factors plus the 
constant, we use m = 18. We use m = 6 when we adjust for risk using the FFC factor 
speciﬁcation. We then average over funds in each decile in each month, that is, we 
compute, for each decile, a monthly average value added. At the end of the horizon, 
funds are again sorted into deciles based on the skill ratio at that time, and the process is 
repeated as many times as the data allows.13 At the end of the process, in each decile, we 
have a time series of monthly estimates for average value added. For each decile, we then 
compute the mean of this time series and its standard error. This procedure ensures that 
there is no selection bias because this strategy is tradable and could be implemented by an 
13We choose the starting point to ensure that the last month is always included in the sample. 
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investor in real time. We therefore do not require funds to exist for the full measurement
 
horizon. Finally note that this strategy uses non-overlapping data.14 
Figure 2 plots the mean as well as the two standard error bounds for each decile and 
time horizon. From Figure 2 it appears that there is evidence of persistence as far out as 
10 years. The point estimate of the average value added of 10th decile managers is positive 
at every horizon and is always the best preforming decile. The value added estimates are 
economically large. Although clearly noisy, the average tenth decile manager adds around 
$2 million/month. Table 4 formally tests the Null Hypothesis that the value added of 
10th decile is zero or less, under the usual asymptotic assumptions. The Null Hypothesis 
is rejected at every horizon at the 95% conﬁdence interval, however, as we have noted 
above we have concerns about the validity of the t-test.15 
If managers are skilled, and there are cross-sectional diﬀerences in the amount of skill, 
then relative performance will be persistent. Hence, we can use relative performance 
comparisons to construct a more powerful test of the strong form of the Null Hypothesis 
(that skill does not exist) by counting the number of times the 10th decile outperforms 
the 1st, and the number of times the 10th decile is in the top half.16 As is evident from 
Table 4, the Null Hypothesis can be rejected at the 95% conﬁdence level at almost all 
horizons. The FFC factor speciﬁcation produces much more deﬁnitive results; with the 
sole exception of the nine-year horizon, the Null Hypothesis can be rejected at the 99% 
conﬁdence level. Based on the results of this non-parametric test, we can deﬁnitively 
reject the strong form of the Null Hypothesis: skilled managers exist. Finally, note from 
the ﬁnal column of Table 4 the disproportionate share of capital controlled by 10th decile 
14Note that even after dropping the ﬁrst m observations, the strategy is still tradable, because it is 
implementable at τ + m. 
15The earlier concerns are less important in this case because in each month we average over funds 
so the t-statistic is calculated using time series observations of the decile mean, thereby substantially 
reducing the eﬀect of cross fund correlation and excess kurtosis. 
16Because the volatility of the deciles varies, we restrict attention to tests where the probability under 
the Null Hypothesis is not a function of the volatility of the decile. 
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Vanguard Benchmark FFC Risk Measure 
Equally Weighted 
t-statistic 
2.74 
0.73 
-3.88 
-1.40 
Value Weighted 
t-statistic 
-0.95 
-0.31 
-5.88 
-2.35 
Table 5: Net Alpha (in b.p./month): The table reports the net alpha of two investment strategies: 
Investing $1 every month by equally weighting over all existing funds (Equally Weighted) and investing 
$1 every month by value weighting (based on AUM) over all existing funds (Value Weighted). 
managers. Investors reward skilled managers by providing them with more capital. 
It might be tempting, based on our sorts, to conclude that all the skill is concentrated 
in 10th decile managers, that is, at most 10% of managers actually have skill. But caution 
is in order here. Our sorts are unlikely to separate skill perfectly. Although the estimates 
of value added in the other deciles are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, they are 
almost all positive. Since we know that many managers destroyed value over the sample 
period, these positive point estimates imply that enough skilled managers are distributed 
throughout the other deciles to overcome the signiﬁcant fraction of managers that destroy 
value. 
Our persistence results stand in contrast to the existing literature that has found little 
evidence of persistence, mainly concentrated at horizons of less than a year and in poorly 
performing funds. The reason we ﬁnd such strong evidence of persistence is due to our 
measure of skill — value added. If, instead, a return measure is used as the measure of 
skill, then the endogenous ﬂow of funds obscures this evidence. 
5.2 Returns to Investors 
Given the evidence of skill, a natural question to ask is who beneﬁts from this skill? That 
is, do mutual fund companies and managers capture all the rents, or are these rents shared 
with investors? Table 5 provides summary evidence. The average net alpha across all 
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Deciles Sorted on Skill Ratio 
Low 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 High 
Panel A: Vanguard Benchmark 
Value Added -0.76 -0.68 -0.54 -0.39 -0.22 -0.05 0.24 0.54 1.19 2.03 
Realized Net Alpha -28 -9 -10 -7 -2 0 7 7 14 25 
AUM 234 358 348 399 421 441 489 495 616 760 
Age 141 220 198 217 209 238 247 242 240 234 
Compensation 0.16 0.27 0.29 0.34 0.35 0.39 0.44 0.43 0.52 0.62 
Fees 1.14 1.26 1.30 1.29 1.32 1.32 1.35 1.32 1.31 1.25 
Panel B: FCC Risk Adjustment 
Value Added -0.91 -0.67 -0.53 -0.52 -0.33 -0.12 0.15 0.53 1.35 2.08 
Realized Net Alpha -35 -19 -14 -5 -2 1 7 10 17 24 
AUM 193 263 261 402 413 472 446 505 700 727 
Age 196 245 208 265 230 231 233 243 241 276 
Compensation 0.19 0.21 0.22 0.33 0.34 0.39 0.38 0.43 0.57 0.60 
Fees 1.38 1.28 1.28 1.25 1.23 1.24 1.30 1.32 1.27 1.24 
Table 6: Characteristics of Deciles Sorted on the Skill Ratio: Value Added is the within decile 
average Sˆi in Y2000 $ millions/month, Compensation is the within decile average of qitfit/Ti, (in 
Y2000 $ millions/month), Fees (in %/annum) is the within decile average fit/Ti, Realized Net Alpha 
(in b.p./month) is the realized (ex-post) abnormal return to investors, AUM is average assets under 
management (in Y2000 $ millions) and Age is the average number of monthly observations in the decile. 
funds is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, so there is no evidence that investors share 
in the fruits of this skill. 
Lower net alpha estimates are produced when the FFC factors are used as a measure of 
risk. In fact, on a value weighted basis, investors earned a signiﬁcantly negative net alpha. 
But, as we have noted, relying on these estimates requires the additional assumption that 
this model correctly measures risk. If one instead interprets the FFC factor portfolios 
as the alternative investment opportunity set, then one would expect a negative alpha 
because these portfolios ignore transaction costs and were not necessarily available to 
investors at the time. 
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6 Skill and Labor Markets 
To see how realized value added is cross-sectionally distributed in the sample, we sorted 
funds into deciles based on the Skill Ratio calculated over the whole sample. The ﬁrst row 
of Table 6 gives the (equal weighted) average value added in each decile. There is clearly 
large variation in the data. The worst decile destroyed almost $800,000 (Y2000) per month 
while the largest decile added about $2 million. Only the top 4 deciles added value, but 
funds in these deciles controlled 52% of the capital under management. Realized (ex post) 
net-alpha increases over the deciles. Interestingly, it is greater than zero for all the deciles 
that added value and is less than zero in all deciles that destroyed value. At least ex-post, 
managers that added value also gave up some of this value to their investors. 
What about ex-ante? That is, would an investor who identiﬁed a skilled manager 
based on past data have expected a positive net alpha? To investigate this possibility, we 
calculate the average net alpha of investing in the out-of-sample sorts. That is, in each 
decile, for each fund and at each point in time, we calculate the net abnormal return, 
= Rn − RBεit it it 
over measurement horizons of three to 10 years. As before, we drop the ﬁrst m observations 
in the measurement horizon, where m = 18 or 6 months for the Vanguard Benchmark 
and the FFC factor speciﬁcation, respectively. We then compute, at each point in time, 
the weighted average net abnormal return of each decile. At the end of the process, in 
each decile, we have a time series of monthly estimates for the weighted average net alpha 
of each decile. This time series represents the payoﬀ of investing $1 in each month in a 
value weighted portfolio of funds in the decile. That is, the return of an extra marginal 
dollar invested in each decile. To get the average net alpha of this strategy, we compute 
the mean of this time series and its standard error. Figure 3 plots this mean as well as 
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Figure 3: Out-of-Sample Net Alpha 
Each graph displays the out-of-sample performance (in b.p./month) of funds sorted into deciles on the 
Skill Ratio, Sˆi, over the horizon indicated. The solid line indicates the performance of each decile and 
the dashed lines indicated the 95% conﬁdence bands (two standard errors from the estimate). Panel A 
shows the results when net alpha is computed using Vanguard index funds as benchmark portfolios, and 
Panel B shows the results using he FFC risk adjustment. 
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Horizon Net Alpha Top Outperforms Bottom Top in Top Half 
Years b.p. t-stat. Freq. (%) p-value (%) Freq. (%) p-value (%) 
Panel A: Vanguard Benchmark 
3 0 0.06 54.21 13.82 58.42 1.21 
4 -3 -0.95 55.76 5.15 57.14 2.07 
5 -1 -0.11 52.33 24.68 52.33 24.68 
6 -2 -0.43 54.91 5.84 55.27 4.56 
7 3 0.99 58.58 0.29 60.08 0.06 
8 -1 -0.29 53.17 18.16 56.54 2.56 
9 -1 -0.46 53.11 16.64 56.41 1.97 
10 -1 -0.24 47.90 78.71 52.10 24.74 
Panel B: FCC Risk Adjustment 
3 2 0.76 59.14 0.00 60.43 0.00 
4 1 0.47 54.97 1.72 57.72 0.05 
5 3 1.11 60.40 0.00 59.19 0.00 
6 3 1.02 58.21 0.02 57.78 0.04 
7 3 1.04 56.12 0.44 56.12 0.44 
8 3 0.88 59.34 0.00 57.36 0.10 
9 3 0.96 57.28 0.05 54.95 1.37 
10 3 1.10 56.09 0.51 55.44 1.11 
Table 7: Out-of-sample Net Alpha of the Top Decile: The columns labeled “Net-Alpha” report 
the weighted average net alpha (in b.p./month) of the top decile at each horizon and the associated 
p-value. The next two columns report the fraction of the time and associate p-value the top decile has 
a net alpha realization greater than the bottom decile. The columns labeled “Top in Top Half” report 
the fraction of time the realized net alpha of the top decile is in the top half. All p-values are one tailed, 
that is, they represent the probability, under the Null Hypothesis, of the observed test-statistic value or 
greater. 
the two standard error bounds for each decile and time horizon. 
Almost all net alpha estimates are not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. 
As we show in Table 7, the point estimates of the tenth decile are very close to zero and 
mostly negative. The order statistics in Table 7 conﬁrm the overall impression from Figure 
3 that there is weak evidence of predictability in net alpha. Of the 16 order statistics, 7 
of them have a one tailed p-value below 5% and only two are below 1%. So, at best, there 
is weak evidence that by picking the best managers, investors can get better returns than 
by picking the worst managers. The evidence appears more consistent with the idea that 
competition in capital markets drives net alphas close to zero. 
In this case, there is a striking diﬀerence when we use the FFC factor speciﬁcation as a 
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risk adjustment. There is strong, statistically signiﬁcant evidence of relative performance 
diﬀerences across the deciles (all but 3 of the order statistics are below 1% in this case). 
Both Figure 3 and Table 7 provide convincing out-of-sample evidence that investors could 
have done better by picking managers based on the Skill Ratio. These out-of-sample net 
alpha results are intriguing because they imply that either investors are leaving money 
on the table (not enough funds are ﬂowing to the best managers resulting in positive 
net alphas), or investors do not care about the net alpha relative to the FFC factor 
speciﬁcation, raising the possibility that the FFC factor speciﬁcation does not measure 
risk that investors care about. 
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Figure 4: Out-of-Sample Compensation 
The plots display the average out-of-sample monthly compensation of each decile sorted on the Skill 
Ratio using the Vanguard Benchmark and the FFC risk adjustment. Each line in the plots represents 
a diﬀerent horizon, which varies between three and 10 years. For ease of comparison, the data sample 
(time period) is the same for both plots. 
The evidence is consistent with eﬃcient labor markets: funds managed by better man­
agers earn higher aggregate fees. First, note in Table 6, that the percentage fee is relatively 
constant across the deciles. However, aggregate fees (compensation) across the deciles is 
close to monotonically increasing, especially in the extreme deciles where we have the most 
conﬁdence of our estimates of value added. Ex-post there is a tight relationship between 
measured skill and compensation. And what about ex-ante? Once managers reveal their 
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skill by adding value, do investors reward them with higher subsequent compensation? 
Figure 4 plots out-of-sample compensation and demonstrates that they do. Not only is 
compensation increasing in the deciles, but the average 10th decile fund earns consider­
ably more than funds in the other deciles. Because the average fee does not diﬀer by much 
across deciles, by choosing to allocate their capital to skilled managers, it is investors that 
determine these compensation diﬀerences, conﬁrming a central insight in Berk and Green 
(2004). Figure 4 illustrates, again, that using the FFC risk adjustment makes a material 
diﬀerence. Compensation is still increasing in the deciles, but the diﬀerences are smaller 
than when the Vanguard benchmark is used. 
If investors reward better funds with higher compensation, then they must be able 
to identify better managers ex ante. Thus, compensation should predict performance. 
To test this inference, we repeat the previous sorting procedure, except we use total 
compensation rather than the Skill Ratio to sort funds. That is, at the beginning of 
each time horizon, we use the product of the current AUM and fee to sort funds into 
the deciles and then follow the identical procedure we used before. Figure 5 summarizes 
the results and shows that current compensation does predict future performance. When 
managers are sorted into deciles by their current compensation, the relative diﬀerence in 
performance across the deciles is slightly larger than when the Skill Ratio is used (i.e., 
Figure 5 vs. Figure 2). 
There is also increased monotonicity when the sorts are based on compensation rather 
than on the Skill Ratio. To formally document this diﬀerence, we count the number of 
times each decile outperforms the next lowest decile (in terms of value added). Table 8 
reports the p-value of observing the reported numbers under the Null Hypothesis that 
there is no skill (so the probability is 1/2). The table conﬁrms what the ﬁgures imply. 
While the Skill Ratio can identify extreme performers, it does not diﬀerentiate other funds 
very well. In contrast, investors appear to do a much better job correctly diﬀerentiating 
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Figure 5: Value Added Sorted on Compensation 
Each graph displays average out-of-sample value added, Sˆi (in Y2000 $ million/month), of funds sorted 
into deciles based on total compensation (fees × AUM). The solid line indicates the performance of each 
decile and the dashed lines indicated the 95% conﬁdence bands (two standard errors from the estimate). 
Panel A shows the results when value added is computed using Vanguard index funds as benchmark 
portfolios, and Panel B shows the results using the FFC risk adjustment. 
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Vanguard Benchmark FFC Risk Adjustment 
Horizon Skill Ratio Compensation Skill Ratio Compensation 
3 18.55 9.17 2.76 72.15 
4 3.51 1.87 12.20 4.89 
5 18.61 0.02 8.40 48.81 
6 4.57 9.23 0.58 3.24 
7 15.92 5.85 0.53 17.52 
8 4.16 3.79 4.88 25.58 
9 28.61 14.71 5.97 3.90 
10 53.02 0.25 16.38 4.82 
Table 8: Out-of-sample Monotonicity: At each horizon, we calculate the number of times each 
decile outperforms the next lowest decile. The table shows the p-value (in percent) of the observed 
frequency under the Null Hypothesis that skill does not exist, i.e., that for a sample length of N months, 
the probability of the event is Binomial(9N, 1/2). 
all funds. We again see a diﬀerence when the FFC factor speciﬁcation is used to adjust for 
risk. In this case, investors do not appear to diﬀerentiate as well, consistent with the prior 
evidence that compensation is not as highly correlated with subsequent performance. 
For many years now, researchers have characterized the behavior of investors in the 
mutual fund sector as suboptimal, that is, dumb investors chasing past returns. Our evi­
dence relating compensation to future performance suggests quite the opposite. Investors 
appear able to diﬀerentiate good managers from bad and compensate them accordingly. 
Notice from Figure 1 that real compensation for the top managers has increased over 
time, that is, fund size has increased while fees have remained constant. On the other 
hand, for median managers, real compensation has remained constant, suggesting that 
overall increases in compensation, in at least this sector of the ﬁnancial services industry, 
are rewards for skill. 
7 Separating Out Diversiﬁcation Services 
The Vanguard benchmarks are constructed from net returns while the funds’ value added 
numbers are constructed using gross returns. Because Vanguard index funds provide 
diversiﬁcation services, this means our value-added measure includes both the diversiﬁca­
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Active Funds Index Funds 
Benchmark Vanguard Gross Vanguard Net Vanguard Gross Vanguard Net 
Number of funds 5974 5974 644 644 
In Sample VA 
Mean ($mil/mon) 0.07 0.14 -0.05 0.03 
t-statistic 2.49 4.57 -0.49 0.37 
Weighted Mean ($mil/mon) 0.16 0.27 -0.02 0.11 
t-statistic 3.46 5.74 -0.20 0.94 
1st percentile -3.83 -3.60 -6.18 -5.98 
5th percentile -1.27 -1.15 -1.20 -1.15 
10th percentile -0.64 -0.59 -0.53 -0.47 
50th percentile -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 
90th percentile 0.61 0.75 0.50 0.76 
95th percentile 1.55 1.80 1.56 1.82 
99th percentile 7.56 7.82 4.83 4.83 
In Sample Net Alpha 
Equally Weighted (b.p./mon) - 2.7 - -1.9 
t-statistic - 0.73 - -0.41 
Value Weighted (b.p./mon) - -1.0 - 1.3 
t-statistic - -0.31 - 0.65 
Persistence (p-value (%) of the top decile outperforming the bottom decile at each horizon) 
3 year horizon 4.31 4.75 - ­
4 year horizon 18.59 2.07 - ­
5 year horizon 0.90 3.54 - ­
6 year horizon 2.12 1.09 - ­
7 year horizon 0.00 0.01 - ­
8 year horizon 0.05 0.67 - ­
9 year horizon 4.88 9.15 - ­
10 year horizon 4.32 5.55 - ­
Table 9: Performance of Active Funds and Index Funds: The table computes the value added, 
net alphas and the p-value of the persistence order statistic that counts the number of times the top decile 
outperforms the bottom decile for the set of active mutual funds, and compares it the set of index funds 
(including the Vanguard index funds themselves). To separate the value added coming from diversiﬁcation 
beneﬁts vs. stock picking/market timing, we use two diﬀerent benchmarks: (1) Vanguard index funds 
gross returns and (2) Vanguard index funds net returns, labeled “Vanguard Gross” and “Vanguard Net” 
in the table. 
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tion beneﬁts as well as other skills and services that managers provide. Therefore, if an 
active manager chooses to do nothing other than exactly replicate a Vanguard benchmark 
fund, we would compute a positive value added for that fund equal to the diversiﬁcation 
beneﬁts it provides (i.e., the fees charged by Vanguard times the size of the fund). So 
a natural question to ask is what fraction of value added is compensation for providing 
diversiﬁcation and what fraction can be attributed to other skills? 
We answer this question by recomputing value added using the gross returns (including 
fees) of the Vanguard funds as the benchmark and comparing that to our earlier measures. 
The ﬁrst two columns of Table 9 demonstrate that about half the value added is due to 
diversiﬁcation beneﬁts ($70,000 per month) and half ($70,000 per month) is due to other 
types of skill, such as stock picking and/or market timing. The non-diversiﬁcation skills 
are also persistent. As the bottom panel in Table 9 demonstrates, when funds are sorted 
on the Skill Ratio computed using Vanguard gross returns as the benchmark, the top 
decile consistently outperforms the bottom decile.17 Similar results are obtained when 
we use the ex-post distribution of skill (i.e., equation 9). Slightly less than half the value 
added can be attributed to diversiﬁcation beneﬁts. 
Although Vanguard is widely regarded as the most eﬃcient provider of diversiﬁcation 
services, one might be concerned that Vanguard is not as eﬃcient as the representative 
index fund. The evidence in Table 9 should allay such concerns. When value added of the 
average index fund is computed using Vanguard gross returns as the benchmark (third 
column of the table), the estimates are negative, implying that Vanguard is more eﬃcient 
at providing diversiﬁcation services than the average index fund. Vanguard’s eﬃciency 
advantage implies that if we had used portfolios of representative index funds instead of 
just Vanguard’s funds, our value added numbers would be larger. 
17The other order statistics also support persistence and are available upon request. 
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8 Sample Selection 
The existence of numerous selection biases that have inﬂuenced the inferences of prior 
mutual fund studies is well known. Consequently, we have been careful to make sure that 
this study is free of such biases. We therefore use the full set of actively managed mutual 
funds available to a U.S. investor at the time. This means we do not exclude funds that 
invest internationally, so the set of funds in our study is considerably larger than the 
set previously studied in the literature. One may therefore wonder to what extent the 
selection bias induced by restricting the dataset to funds that only invest in U.S. stocks 
would aﬀect our inferences. Introducing this selection bias neither aﬀects our persistence 
results (skilled managers remain skilled) nor does it aﬀect our results regarding returns to 
investors: net alphas are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero when managers are evaluated 
against the tradable benchmark. However, it does aﬀect our average value added results. 
In Table 10 we form subsamples of active and index funds based on their ex post average 
portfolio weight in international stocks. We ﬁnd that active funds that invested more in 
international stocks added more value. Funds that restricted themselves to only investing 
in U.S. stocks (on average, less than 10% in non-U.S. stocks) added no value on average. 
One potential concern is that our Vanguard benchmark funds do not appropriately 
deﬁne the alternative investment opportunity set for international stocks, even though 
we include all the international index funds that Vanguard oﬀers. If this explanation is 
right, it implies that index funds that invest more internationally will add more value. 
Table 10 shows that this is not the case. We ﬁnd that index funds that invested more in 
international stocks added less value. Therefore, the ex post selection of active funds that 
have invested more or less in international funds appears to be correlated with skill. It 
is unclear how investors could have known this fact ex ante, which is why we use the full 
cross-section of mutual funds traded in the U.S. in this study. 
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Active Funds 
Vanguard BM Net Vanguard BM Gross 
Frac. int. No of funds Mean VA Mean VA TW Mean VA Mean VA TW 
<10 3740 0 0.013 -0.045 -0.073 
<30 4617 0.055 0.126 -0.002 0.025 
<50 4817 0.074 0.159 0.016 0.056 
<70 5002 0.106 0.219 0.045 0.113 
<90 5236 0.133 0.266 0.073 0.158 
≤ 100 5974 0.135 0.269 0.072 0.162 
Index Funds 
Vanguard BM Net Vanguard BM Gross 
Frac. int. No of funds Mean VA Mean VA TW Mean VA Mean VA TW 
<10 462 0.102 0.175 0.034 0.032 
<30 485 0.094 0.167 0.028 0.021 
<50 494 0.123 0.178 0.042 0.056 
<70 509 0.121 0.177 0.041 0.051 
<90 521 0.070 0.163 0.026 -0.003 
≤ 100 644 0.034 0.114 -0.025 -0.046 
Table 10: Fraction in International Funds and the Performance of Active Funds vs Index 
Funds: The table computes value added numbers for funds with varying degrees of international stock 
exposure. We compute the numbers for active as well as passive funds. We use two diﬀerent benchmarks: 
(1) Vanguard index funds net returns and (2) Vanguard index funds gross returns. 
9 Conclusion 
In this paper we reject the Null Hypothesis that mutual fund managers have no skill. We 
show that the average mutual fund generates value of about $2 million/year. This value 
added cannot easily be attributable to luck alone because it is persistent for as long as 10 
years into the future. Furthermore, investors appear to be able to identify and correctly 
reward this skill. Not only do better funds collect higher aggregate fees, but current 
aggregate fees are a better predictor of future value added than past value added. 
Our results are consistent with the main predictions of Berk and Green (2004). In­
vestors appear to be able to identify skilled managers and determine their compensation 
through the ﬂow–performance relation. That model also assumes that because rational 
investors compete in capital markets, the net alpha to investors is zero, that is, managers 
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are able to capture all economic rents themselves. In this paper, we ﬁnd that the average 
abnormal return to investors is close to zero. Further, we ﬁnd little evidence that investors 
can generate a positive net alpha by investing with the best funds. 
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Appendix 
A Benchmarks Funds with Unequal Lives 
In this appendix, we explain how we construct our set of benchmarks. We show how to 
evaluate a fund relative to two benchmarks that exist over diﬀerent periods of time. The 
general case with N benchmark funds is a straightforward generalization and is left to 
the reader. 
Let Rg denote the gross excess return of active fund i at time t, which is stacked in it 
the vector Ri 
g : ⎤
⎡
 
Rg i1 
Rg i =

⎢⎣
 .
 .
 . 
Rg iT 
⎥⎦
 
and let RB denote the return on the ﬁrst benchmark fund and RB the return on the 1t 2t 
second benchmark fund, which, over the time period in which they both exist, form the 
matrix Rt 
B :   
RB = RB RB .t 1t 2t
Assume that the ﬁrst benchmark fund is available to investors over the whole sample 
period, while the second benchmark fund is only available over a subset of the sample, 
say the second half. 
Let β denote the pro jection coeﬃcient of Rg on the ﬁrst benchmark fund’s return, it 
R1
B 
t, and let  
 

γ1γ ≡ . 
γ2
denote the projection coeﬃcients of Rg on both benchmark funds, RB and R2
B 
t. Thus, it 1t 
during the time period when only the ﬁrst benchmark exists, the value added of the fund 
at time t is: 
Vit = qi,t−1 it 1tR
g − β RB . (18) 
When both benchmark funds are oﬀered, the value-added in period t is: 
Rg − RBVit = qi,t−1 it t γ . (19) 
Let there be T time periods and suppose that the second benchmark fund starts in period 
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� � 
S + 1. The matrix of benchmark return observations is given by:
 ⎡
 
1 RB 11 · 
. . . . . . · 
1 RB 1S · 
1 RB 1,S+1 R
B 
2,S+1 
. . . . . . . . . 
1 RB 1T R
B 
2T 
⎤
 ⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
 
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
 
X =
 
where · indicates a missing value. Let XO denote the following orthogonal matrix: 
⎡
 
1 RB 11 R¯
BO 
2 
. . . . . . . . . 
1 RB 1S R¯
BO 
2 
1 RB 1,S+1 R
B O 
2,S+1 
. . . . . . . . . 
1 RB 1T R
BO 
2,T 
⎤
 ⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
 
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
 
XO =
 
where: 
T 
RBO 2t 
t=S+1
R¯2 
BO = . 
T − S 
and where RBO , ..., RBO are obtained by projecting RB onto RB :2,S+1 2,T 2t 1t 
RBO = RB − θRB for t = S + 1, ..., T 2t 2t 1t 
where, 
cov RB , RB 2t 1tθ = . 
var (R1
B 
t) 
Finally, deﬁne:
 ⎡
 ⎤
 
1 RB 11 0 
. . . . . . . . . 
1 RB 1S 0 
1 RB 1,S+1 R
B O 
2,S+1 
. . . . . . . . . 
1 RB 1T R
BO 
2,T 
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
 
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
 
XˆO =
 .
 
Proposition 1 The value-added of the ﬁrm at any time t can be estimated as follows:
 
Rg XˆO XˆOVit = qi,t−1 it − ζ2 2t − ζ3 3t (20) 
45 
� �
  
    
  
� �
    
using a single OLS regression to estimate ζ:
 
XO
� 
XO 
−1 
XO�Rgζ = i . 
Proof: The second and the third column of XO are orthogonal to each other, both over 
the full sample as well as over the two subsamples. Because of this orthogonality and 
X2
O 
t = R1
B 
t, the regression coeﬃcient ζ2 is given by: 
Rgcov , RB it 1tζ2 = = β . var (R1
B 
t) 
So for any t ≤ S, (20) reduces to (18) and so this estimate of value added is consistent 
over the ﬁrst subsample. Using the orthogonality of XO , 
Rg Rgcov , X O cov , RBO it 3t it 2tζ3 = = , var (RB O var (X3
O 
t) 2t ) 
rewriting 
+ RB O + γ2R
BO γ1R
B + γ2R
B = γ1R
B 
1t 2t 1t + γ2 θR1
B 
t 2t = (γ1 + θγ2) R1
B 
t 2t 
and using the fact that linear projections are unique implies 
ζ2 = β = γ1 + θγ2 
and 
ζ3 = γ2. 
So for t > S , 
Rg XˆO XˆOVit = qi,t−1 it − ζ2 2t − ζ3 3t 
− γ2RBO = Rg − (γ1 + θγ2) RB qi,t−1 it 1t 2t 
= Rg − γ1RB − γ2RB qi,t−1 it 1t 2t 
which is (19) and so the estimate is also consistent over the second subsample. 
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B Robustness 
Table 11 reports the results of conducting our study within diﬀerent subsamples of our 
data. We select the samples based on the time period and whether managers invest 
internationally. Even when we consider active funds that invest in U.S. equity only, we 
always use all 11 Vanguard index funds at the benchmark. 
Beg-3/11 
All Equity 
1/84-9/06 1/90-3/11 
U.S. Equity Only 
Beg-3/11 1/84-9/06 1/90-3/11 
In Sample VA 
Mean ($mil/mon) 
Weighted Mean ($mil/mon) 
Panel A: Vanguard Benchmark 
0.14** 0.28** 0.14** 
0.27** 0.42** 0.29** 
-0.01 
-0.00 
0.01 
-0.05 
-0.02 
0.00 
In Sample Net Alpha 
Equally Weighted (b.p./mon) 
Value Weighted (b.p./mon) 
3 
-1 
-7* 
-7* 
-5* 
-5* 
-1 
-5 
-11** 
-12** 
-6** 
-8** 
Total Number of Funds 5974 4599 5943 2731 2218 2700 
In Sample VA 
Mean ($mil/mon) 
Weighted Mean ($mil/mon) 
Panel B: FCC Risk Adjustment 
0.10** 0.15** 0.16** 
0.25** 0.37** 0.29** 
-0.07 
-0.05 
-0.03 
-0.02 
-0.05* 
0.00 
In Sample Net Alpha 
Equally Weighted (b.p./mon) 
Value Weighted (b.p./mon) 
-4 
-6** 
-9* 
-7* 
-8* 
-5 
-7** 
-8** 
-9** 
-10** 
-7* 
-8* 
Total Number of Funds 6054 4599 5943 2811 2218 2700 
Table 11: Subsample Analysis: Beg is the beginning date of our sample, 1/77 for 
Vanguard Benchmark and 1/62 for FFC Risk Adjustment. * – t-statistic greater (in 
absolute value) than 1.96. **– t-statistic greater (in absolute value) than 2.54. 
47
 
References 
Baker, M., L. Litov, J. A. Wachter, and J. Wurgler (2010): “Can Mutual 
Fund Managers Pick Stocks? Evidence from Their Trades Prior to Earnings Announce­
ments,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 45(05), 1111–1131. 
Berk, J. B., and R. C. Green (2004): “Mutual Fund Flows and Performance in 
Rational Markets,” Journal of Political Economy, 112(6), 1269–1295. 
Berk, J. B., and I. Tonks (2007): “Return Persistence and Fund Flows in the Worst 
Performing Mutual Funds,” Working Paper 13042, National Bureau of Economic Re­
search. 
Bogle, J. C. (1997): “The First Index Mutual Fund: A History of Vanguard Index 
Trust and the Vanguard Index Strategy,” Discussion paper, The Vanguard Group. 
Bollen, N. P. B., and J. A. Busse (2001): “On the Timing Ability of Mutual Fund 
Managers,” The Journal of Finance, 56(3), 1075–1094. 
(2005): “Short-Term Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance,” Review of Fi­
nancial Studies, 18(2), 569–597. 
Carhart, M. M. (1997): “On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance,” Journal of 
Finance, 52, 57–82. 
Chen, H.-L., N. Jegadeesh, and R. Wermers (2000): “The Value of Active Mu­
tual Fund Management: An Examination of the Stockholdings and Trades of Fund 
Managers,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 35, 343–368. 
Cohen, L., A. Frazzini, and C. Malloy (2007): “The Small World of Investing: 
Board Connections and Mutual Fund Returns,” Working Paper 13121, National Bureau 
of Economic Research. 
Cohen, R. B., C. K. Polk, and B. Silli (2010): “Best Ideas,” SSRN eLibrary. 
Coval, J. D., and T. J. Moskowitz (2001): “The Geography of Investment: Informed 
Trading and Asset Prices,” The Journal of Political Economy, 109(4), pp. 811–841. 
Cremers, K. J. M., and A. Petajisto (2009): “How Active Is Your Fund Manager? 
A New Measure That Predicts Performance,” Review of Financial Studies, 22(9), 3329– 
3365. 
Daniel, K., M. Grinblatt, S. Titman, and R. Wermers (1997): “Measuring 
Mutual Fund Performance with Characteristic-Based Benchmarks,” Journal of Finance, 
52, 1035–1058. 
Del Guercio, D., and J. Reuter (2013): “Mutual Fund Performance and the Incen­
tive to Generate Alpha,” Journal of Finance, Forthcoming. 
48
 
Fama, E. F. (1965): “The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices,” Journal of Business, 38(1), 
34–105. 
(1970): “Eﬃcient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work,” 
Journal of Finance, 25(2), 383–417. 
Fama, E. F., and K. R. French (1995): “Size and Book-to-Market Factors in Earnings 
and Returns,” Journal of Finance, 50, 131–155. 
(2010): “Luck versus Skill in the Cross-Section of Mutual Fund Returns,” The 
Journal of Finance, 65(5), 1915–1947. 
Grinblatt, M., and S. Titman (1989): “Mutual Fund Performance: An Analysis of 
Quarterly Portfolio Holdings,” The Journal of Business, 62(3), pp. 393–416. 
(1993): “Performance Measurement without Benchmarks: An Examination of 
Mutual Fund Returns,” The Journal of Business, 66(1), pp. 47–68. 
Gruber, M. J. (1996): “Another Puzzle: The Growth in Actively Managed Mutual 
Funds,” Journal of Finance, 51, 783–810. 
Jensen, M. C. (1968): “The Performance of Mutual Funds in the Period 1945–1964,” 
Journal of Finance, 23, 389–416. 
Jiang, H., M. Verbeek, and Y. Wang (2011): “Information Content When Mutual 
Funds Deviate from Benchmarks,” SSRN eLibrary. 
Kacperczyk, M., S. V. Nieuwerburgh, and L. Veldkamp (2011): “Time-Varying 
Fund Manager Skill,” Working Paper 17615, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Kacperczyk, M., C. Sialm, and L. Zheng (2005): “On the Industry Concentration 
of Actively Managed Equity Mutual Funds,” The Journal of Finance, 60(4), pp. 1983– 
2011. 
(2008): “Unobserved Actions of Mutual Funds,” Review of Financial Studies, 
21(6), 2379–2416. 
Kosowski, R., A. Timmermann, R. Wermers, and H. White (2006): “Can Mutual 
Fund ’Stars’ Really Pick Stocks? New Evidence from a Bootstrap Analysis.,” Journal 
of Finance, 61(6), 2551 – 2595. 
Linnainmaa, J. T. (2012): “Reverse Survivorship Bias,” Journal of Finance, forthcom­
ing. 
Lucas, Robert E., J. (1978): “On the Size Distribution of Business Firms,” The Bell 
Journal of Economics, 9(2), pp. 508–523. 
Malkiel, B. G. (1995): “Returns from Investing in Equity Mutual Funds 1971 to 1991,” 
The Journal of Finance, 50(2), pp. 549–572. 
49
 
Mamaysky, H., M. Spiegel, and H. Zhang (2008): “Estimating the Dynamics of 
Mutual Fund Alphas and Betas,” Review of Financial Studies, 21(1), 233–264. 
Pastor, L., and R. F. Stambaugh (2002): “Mutual fund performance and seemingly 
unrelated assets,” Journal of Financial Economics, 63(3), 315 – 349. 
(2010): “On the Size of the Active Management Industry,” Working Paper 
15646, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Sharpe, W. F. (1991): “The Arithmetic of Active Management,” Financial Analysts 
Journal, 47(1), pp. 7–9. 
Shumway, T., M. B. Szefler, and K. Yuan (2009): “The Information Content of 
Revealed Beliefs in Portfolio Holdings,” . 
Wermers, R. (2000): “Mutual Fund Performance: An Empirical Decomposition into 
Stock-Picking Talent, Style, Transactions Costs, and Expenses,” The Journal of Fi­
nance, 55(4), 1655–1703. 
Zheng, J. X. (1999): “Testing Heteroskedasticity in Nonlinear and Nonparametric Re­
gressions with an Application to Interest Rate Volatility,” Working paper, University 
of Texas at Austin. 
50
 
